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Argentina’s debt default in 2001 moved the international community to launch initiatives to develop 
procedures for the orderly restructuring of unsustainable sovereign debt. These initiatives come against 
the backdrop of the increase in public debt in emerging market economies over the last decade, of
large-scale ﬁ  nancial crises linked to the level or structure of sovereign debt and, a recent development, of 
several cases of sovereign default on international bonds.
These developments pose two challenges. Firstly, the complexity of sovereign debt dynamics makes it 
necessary to strengthen international institutions’ assessment capacity. The International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) has thus launched initiatives to improve the assessment of debt sustainability and balance sheet 
weaknesses. 
Secondly, the developments have prompted the re-examination of IMF facilities for managing debt crises.
The absence of a clear framework in this area could create a moral hazard risk, as the international 
community could be tempted to avoid necessary restructuring by granting substantial ﬁ  nancial assistance.
In practice, deﬁ  ning such a framework is complex, given that reforms in the area of restructuring inﬂ  uence the 
way in which debts are structured. In fact, the features of sovereign debt aim to reconcile two requirements: 
ﬁ  rst, ensuring that the sovereign debtor honours the terms of the debt contract if it has the means to do so
(ex ante efﬁ  ciency); second, making sure that the cost of default is not excessive when the sovereign debtor 
is effectively unable to pay back (ex post efﬁ  ciency).
The international community currently favours a market-based approach. Its ﬁ  rst pillar is a result of the 
development and spread of collective action clauses (CAC), following the Quarles Report by the Group
of 10. Incorporated into debt contracts, CAC aim to reduce the problems arising in inter-creditor co-ordination, 
by deﬁ  ning, in advance, the decision rules applicable in the event of re-negotiation. The “Principles for Stable 
Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring in Emerging Markets”, whose deﬁ  nition was fostered notably by 
the Governor of the Banque de France and the Group of 20, form the second pillar. They supply guidelines 
for the parties involved to steer the exchange of information and facilitate co-ordination between debtors 
and creditors.
The market-based approach is not exclusive of a formal regime, e.g. the IMF’s Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Mechanism (SDRM), where such a regime is feasible. In the market-based approach, the IMF acts as an 
expert via the supply of information and analyses, and also as a “monitor”  via the negotiation and monitoring 
of programmes. The provision of loans, which is in principle limited, aims mainly to facilitate renegotiation 
by giving credibility to the sovereign’s policy. By contrast, a more formal regime would suppose limiting IMF 
involvement, so as to guarantee the independence of the mechanism. Whatever the case, the efﬁ  ciency 
of the overhauled restructuring framework, which is built on contractual provisions and general principles 
rather than on a formal regime, will depend on the Fund’s capacity to fully perform its three functions.
NB: This article takes up the main elements of the  presentation by Marc-Olivier Strauss-Kahn at the panel discussion of the fourth Journée organised by the Banque de France
   Foundation on “Micro, macro and international liquidity”. Daniel Cohen, Olivier Jeanne, José de Matos, Hyun Song Shin and Jean Tirole also participated.ARTICLES
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T
his paper aims to provide insight into 
the rationale behind the recent changes 
in the international ﬁ  nancial architecture 
with regard to the (re)structuring of sovereign debts. 
Broadly speaking, there are two categories of reform: 
those that aim to counter the risk of illiquidity 
and those that aim to counter that of insolvency.
To cope with liquidity crises, several proposals have 
been advanced to restructure the IMF’s ﬁ  nancial 
assistance facilities, which for some goes as far as 
giving the Fund the role of a quasi international 
lender of last resort (LLR) following the example 
of Fischer (1999);1 or of ﬁ  rst resort following that 
of Cohen and Portes (2004). At the same time, 
the efﬁ  ciency of the Fund’s ﬁ  nancial assistance 
has been analysed theoretically and empirically,2 
with the conclusions suggesting that the catalytic 
effect of the Fund’s ﬁ  nancial assistance is neither 
systematic nor automatic.
With regard to the risk of insolvency, the proposal 
for the adoption of a formal international bankruptcy 
regime presented by Krueger (2001) undoubtedly 
constitutes a key contribution to recent initiatives in 
this ﬁ  eld, notwithstanding Sachs’s proposal for such 
a regime back in 1995. However, the importance of 
this proposal should not conceal the fact that debt 
restructuring has been discussed throughout the last 
decade and on the basis of approaches that have not 
been limited to the statutory approach proposed by the 
IMF. The main aspects of the so-called market-based 
approach in fact emerged in the middle of the 1990s. 
Collective action clauses (CAC) were proposed back 
in 1995, notably by Eichengreen and Portes (1995), 
i.e. seven years before the Quarles Report published 
by a G10 Working Group, which aimed to generalise 
the use of these clauses. In addition, work has been 
initiated on the concept of temporary payment 
suspension without international bankruptcy law, 
for example in Haldane and Kruger (2001), Samuels 
(2000) and Couillault and Weber (2003). Proposals 
based on contractual engineering were advanced by 
private agents, such as Bartholomew et al. (2002).
 
The paper ﬁ  rst examines the level and structure of 
the debt incurred by emerging market sovereign 
debtors, as well as its optimality (1). It then goes on 
to review the implications of various reform (or no 
reform) options in the area of restructuring, explaining 
why the international community, which includes 
international ﬁ   nancial institutions and informal 
discussion groupings (mainly the G7, G10 and G20), 
currently favours a market-based approach (2).
1| RISKS AND RATIONALITY
  OF VARIOUS FORMS OF DEBT
1|1  Too much debt?
THREE STYLISED FACTS
Three stylised facts3 on emerging market sovereign 
debt come to light when the last ten years are 
compared to the 1980s.
• The share of sovereign debt4 in GDP is once again 
on the upswing after reaching a low point in 1996: 
sovereign debt represented 68% of GDP on average 
at the end of 2003, up from 56% in 1996 (see Chart 1, 
in which 16 out of 28 countries are situated below 
the bisector indicating that the stock of debt, as a 
percentage of GDP, has remained constant). 
1  See also Lerrick and Meltzer (2003). For a discussion of the LLR, see Kremer and Pﬁ  ster (2000).
2  For a theoretical study, see  Morris and Shin (2003); for a survey of the empirical literature  on the catalytic effect of IMF programmes, see Diaz Cassou (2005).
3  See Bachellerie and Couillault (2005) for additional information.
4  For the sake of expediency (data availability), no distinction is made between sovereign debt and public debt in the rest of this paper. This is also because, in practice,
  non-sovereign public debt is often considered to be guaranteed by the state in emerging markets.ARTICLES
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Chart 1
Stock of public debt 




















NB: Sample of  28 countries (Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, 
Columbia, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Israel, 
Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Morocco, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, 
Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Turkey, Uruguay and 
Venezuela).
Sources: IMF, national sources.
• The debt structure of emerging market sovereigns 
has undergone two major transformations since the 
1980s. External bank debt has dropped while bond 
ﬁ  nancing has risen (Chart 2).
Chart 2




















Bank debt Total Bond debt
NB: Public debt and debt guaranteed by a public body. Same sample as for 
Chart 1 (Excluding Korea and Israel).
Source: World Bank (2004), GDF (Global Development Finance) – Banque de 
France calculations.
In addition, emerging market sovereigns increasingly 
obtain ﬁ  nancing from their domestic markets. While 
the average share of the external public debt in GDP 
remained stable over the second half of the 1990s, 
that of domestic debt rose from 20% in 1995 to 31% 
in 2003 (Chart 3).
The structure of sovereign debt issued on the 
international markets is fairly homogenous across 
emerging market economies: it is mostly made up 
of foreign-currency denominated ﬁ  xed-rate bonds. 
International ﬂ   oating rate securities therefore 
accounted for less than 5% of the securities included 
in the calculation of the Global EMBI index5 in 2003, 
compared with 40% in 1994, according to Borensztein 
et al. (2004). Estimates provided by the same authors 
suggest that debt incurred on the domestic markets 
is more heterogeneous across regions (Chart 4). 
• Lastly, the 1975-2004 period saw a transformation in 
the problems related to sovereign debt servicing. 
Chart 3
Stock of external and domestic public debt
1993-2003
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NB: Same sample as for Chart 1.
Sources: IMF, national sources – Banque de France calculations.
5  JP Morgan’s Global Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI) provides an indication of sovereign risk. Bonds issued by the main emerging market sovereigns are included 
in this calculation.ARTICLES
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Chart 4
Structure outstandings
of domestic government bond debt
at the end of 2001
 (% of total)
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Source: Borenzstein and al. (2004).
Chart 5
Sovereign defaults on private creditor debt 1975-2004
A| Number of sovereign defaults and amounts involved
(USD billions)
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Source: Standard & Poor’s (2004) – Banque de France calculations.
While the number of sovereign defaults had dropped 
regularly since 1992 following the implementation 
of the Brady Plan (Chart 5A), the average volume 
of defaults is once again on the upswing, climbing 
from USD 1.8 billion in 1996 to USD 5.4 billion in 
2004, i.e. hovering close to the USD 6.1 billion peak 
reached at the end of the 1980s (Chart 5B). 
At the same time, while remaining predominant, 
sovereign defaults on foreign-currency denominated 
bank debt decreased. They dropped by an average of 
55% between the 1990-1994 period and the 2000-2004 
period. By contrast, defaults on foreign-currency 
bond debt have increased regularly since the ﬁ  rst 
half of the 1980s: they increased by 8.5 on average 
from 1980-1984 and from 2000-2004 (Chart 6). The 
trend is even more marked if it is borne in mind 
that certain sovereign debtors only managed to 
avoid default because they received sometimes 
massive ﬁ  nancial assistance from the IMF. In any 
case, this rise reﬂ  ects the increasing share of bond 
ﬁ  nancing.
Albeit few in number, restructurings of sovereign 
bonds have shaken investors’ perception, related to 
their assessment of the bank debt crisis of the 1980s, 
that the risk of default on this type of ﬁ  nancing was 
lower than for other forms of debt.
Chart 6
Sovereign defaults
Average number by type of debt 1975-2004
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Source: Standard & Poor’s (2004) – Banque de France calculations.ARTICLES
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In this context, the international community, in 
particular, international ﬁ  nancial institutions, must 
improve techniques for assessing the sustainability 
of sovereign debt, all the more so since sustainability 
is a prerequisite for the deﬁ  nition of an action plan 
to prevent and manage sovereign debt related crises.
WHAT IS THE RATIONALE 
BEHIND DEBT SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSES?
While signiﬁ  cant efforts have been underway in 
recent years to bolster the IMF’s analysis framework, 
it is still difﬁ  cult to assess the sustainability of 
sovereign debt given current knowledge and tools.
The recent strengthening of the IMF’s assessment 
capacity explores two avenues: improving projections 
on trends in the ratio of public debt to GDP and 
drawing up a framework for the balance sheet analysis 
of the risks of cross-sector contagion effects.
The systematic conduct of public debt sustainability 
analyses initiated by the IMF in 2002 corresponds 
to the ﬁ  rst avenue. The approach favoured by the 
IMF (2002b) does not, strictly speaking, provide 
indications on the sustainability of the public 
debt-to-GDP ratio, but makes it possible to calculate 
the primary surplus required to stabilise or reduce 
the share of debt in GDP. It remains fairly mechanical 
at present. By construction, the shocks designed to 
assess the risks of the increase in debt do not produce 
any effects beyond the period in which they are 
applied (Chart 7). Their deterministic nature limits 
the IMF’s analyses. Unlike other approaches, such 
as that proposed by Ferrucci and Penalver (2003) 
whose operational character is nonetheless yet to be 
conﬁ  rmed, they do not give a clear indication of the 
probability distribution of debt over time.
Chart 7
IMF analysis of public debt sustainability
Antigua and Barbuda
(% of GDP)
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Source: FMI, Article IV staff report
The balance sheet analysis of cross-sector 
contagion risks constitutes a second avenue 
for the improvement of IMF assessment, but its 
operational integration in the Fund’s ﬁ  nancial 
programming has not yet been completed. A ﬁ  rst 
approach, already applied to assessing the situation 
in Argentina, Uruguay, Turkey, Brazil, Peru and 
Lebanon, for instance, makes it possible to identify 
net sector positions (particularly of exchange rates 
and interest rates) and thus better determine
the weaknesses of the economy and potential
cross-sector spill-over channels. It also makes it 
possible to conduct targeted robustness tests, such 
as the drop in the market value of the assets of a 
sector or the depreciation of the exchange rate.
A second approach of balance sheet analysis, 
proposed by Gapen et al (2004) is under study by 
the IMF. It consists in assessing the risk of sector 
default by calculating the “distance to distress”. ARTICLES
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Applied for example to the corporate sector, this 
indicator combines, in a single measure, the market 
value of aggregated assets, ﬁ  nancial leverage, and 
commercial risk. It is expressed in the number of 
standard deviations (the “distance”) of the market 
value of the assets of the sector from a “distress 
barrier”, which corresponds to the situation in which 
the value of the sectoral net wealth drops to the point 
where it is no longer possible to meet commitments 
(aggregated). In spite of their real intrinsic interest, 
balance sheet analyses of this type come up against 
statistical limitations, particularly with regard to 
non-ﬁ  nancial private sector data.
The relevance of debt sustainability analyses 
is of utmost importance for the international 
community in two respects. Firstly, assessments of 
debt sustainability are instrumental in the design 
of a response in times of crisis, restructuring 
and/or ﬁ   nancial assistance. In this regard, 
sustainability analyses play a crucial role in the 
reduction of the moral hazard risk associated with 
IMF interventions. In practice, the sustainability of 
the stock of public debt is now one of the criteria 
for exceptional access to IMF funds, i.e. access to an 
amount of over 100% of the quota in annual terms 
and 300% in cumulative terms. Secondly, one of the 
possible outcomes of debt sustainability analyses is 
the deﬁ  nition of a more normative approach to debt 
problems. Certain recent studies are consistent with 
this. Cohen and Portes (2004) for example propose 
a system in which the sovereign debtor undertakes 
to refrain from incurring debts if the risk premium 
exceeds a pre-deﬁ  ned level: the sovereign would then 
avoid “validating” spread levels that destabilise the 
debt dynamics, which would then make it possible 
to reduce the risk of a self-fulﬁ  ling conﬁ  dence crisis. 
The advantage of this “debt regime” for the sovereign 
is that if spreads rise beyond this destabilising 
threshold, the IMF will intervene ﬁ  nancially.
Mendoza and Oviedo (2004) outline an approach 
which, although not normative, may be useful for 
the international community’s decision-making if it 
proved to be operational. It notably makes it possible 
to assess a “natural debt limit” that corresponds to the 
difference between the worst performance in terms of 
tax revenues and the lowest level of public expenditure 
that the government may commit itself to reaching 
in the event of a “ﬁ  scal crisis”, this being deﬁ  ned 
as the worst performance in terms of tax revenues 
recorded over a “long period of time”. This debt limit 
therefore represents the maximum stock of debt that 
the government may incur without having to bring 
public expenditure under the politically acceptable, 
or achievable, minimum level. Observance of the 
natural debt limit is therefore a criterion that makes 
it possible to check the credibility of the government’s 
commitment to honouring its debt.
1|2  Debt structure: a chosen risk?
Debt structuring is also a crucial issue. The use 
of short-term market ﬁ  nancing that is indexed on 
volatile variables may entail risks for the parties 
to the contract, either directly (sovereign issuers, 
private creditors) or indirectly (private issuers, 
IMF). One of the issues at stake for the international 
community is to understand the reasons why the 
parties to these ﬁ   nancial contracts prefer such 
ﬁ  nancing methods.
ARE THE FORMS OF DEBT RISKY?
The ﬁ   nancial crises of the last decade have 
highlighted the risks associated with forms of 
debt that are characteristic of emerging market 
sovereigns. Some analysts, such as Reinhart et al. 
(2003), even go as far as casting doubt on the idea 
that more limited access to capital markets hampers 
the growth of these economies. 
The use of short-term ﬁ  nancing  instruments 
denominated in foreign currency — or indexed to 
the exchange rate — and/or ﬂ  oating interest rate 
is a source of ﬁ  nancial vulnerability. It is in fact 
often associated with balance sheet vulnerability, 
in terms of foreign currencies and maturities. It 
contributes in addition to weakening debt dynamics 
by making them more sensitive to variations in 
macroeconomic performances and to volatile 
market expectations. Lastly, it complicates the 
conduct of economic policy. 
The case of “innocent victims”, i.e. sovereign debtors 
that experience a conﬁ  dence crisis in the absence of 
economic or ﬁ  nancial imbalances, is very rare. This 
type of debt structure nevertheless constitutes a 
channel for the dissemination of ﬁ  nancial pressures: 
the drying up of internal or external liquidity in the 
event of a rise in investors’ risk aversion increases 
risk premiums and hardens the sovereign’s budget ARTICLES
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constraint. Reﬁ  nancing at higher rates leads to 
an increase in the stock of debt to be reﬁ  nanced 
subsequently, which is liable to generate unstable 
debt dynamics.
In addition, debt structures and ﬁ  nancial 
pressures interact. The deterioration of sovereign 
debtors’ ﬁ   nancing conditions is traditionally 
accompanied by a change in the nature of debt 
ﬂ  ows. To try to limit the snowball effect linked to the 
rise in risk premiums and prevent the shortening 
of the maturities of new debt ﬂ  ows, sovereigns 
have recourse to ﬁ  nancing instruments that are 
safer for investors, by favouring securities indexed 
to the exchange rate or a domestic price index for 
instance. The changes in the structure of Brazilian 
government bond debt between 2001 and 2003 
illustrate this (Box 1).
Risky forms of debt tend to amplify the phenomena 
traditionally associated with the problems of 
sovereign debt servicing. The Argentine (2001), 
Brazilian (2002) and Uruguayan (2003) crises 
are cases in point of the risks incurred when the 
sovereign borrows mostly in foreign currency.
The IMF (2002b) and Diaz Cassou and al. (2005) 
show that the difﬁ  culties of sovereign debt servicing 
lead to a weakening of domestic banking systems, 
as these systems are often signiﬁ  cantly exposed to 
sovereign risk: during default crises, government 
securities represented 31.8% of the assets of 
domestic banks in Russia (June 1998), 14.3% in 
Ukraine (June 1998), 30% in Pakistan (March 1999) 
and 21% in Argentina (December 2001). The risk for 
credit institutions is all the greater when indexed or 
foreign-currency denominated government securities 
are used as hedging instruments. In addition, the 
problems of servicing sovereign debt often go hand 
in hand with massive withdrawals of bank deposits, 
ﬂ  ight from domestic currencies, net capital outﬂ  ows 
by residents and the hardening of external ﬁ  nancing 
conditions. They also generate negative wealth 
effects linked to residents’ holdings of the sovereign 
debt. Lastly, episodes of re-negotiation of sovereign 
debt are associated with a sharp depreciation of the 
exchange rate, inﬂ  ationary pressures and a rise in 
short-term interest rates, occurrences that in turn 
increase the share of foreign-currency denominated 
debt. The combination of these factors leads to a 
marked slowdown of growth in the year of the crisis. 
It stood on average at a negative 5.1% in the last 
three cases of sovereign default on international 
bond debt (Chart 8).
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NB:   T corresponds to the date indicated in the key for each country, i. e. year 
in which restructuring was announced or payments were suspended. 
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(a) Weighted average (GDP): for the cases of pre-default restructuring, 
excluding the Dominican Republic 
Source: IMF – Banque de France calculations.
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Up till the end of 2001, the Brazilian government 
conducted a strategy of lengthening the maturity of the 
federal bond debt, which led to a rise of over  10 points in 
the share of the debt indexed to the exchange rate in the 
total outstanding amount between January and October 
2001. This increase in currency risk for the sovereign 
fuelled reservations on debt sustainability, at a time when 
the continued existence of the Argentine currency board 
was uncertain and, therefore, the risk of depreciation of 
the Brazilian real was increasing (see chart). 
The lengthening of the maturity of the debt was 
discontinued at the end of 2001. To avoid the sudden 
shortening of the maturity while reducing exchange 
rate risk, the government substituted domestic
inﬂ  ation-indexed securities for exchange rate indexed 
securities, in the particularly turbulent context of 
electoral transition. This change in the indexation 
structure accelerated from September 2002. 
It was only from August 2003 that the lengthening of 
the debt maturity ceased to be subject to the issuance 
of indexed securities, whose stock amounted to up to 
96.4% of total debt in April 2003, a sign of increased 
investor conﬁ  dence.
Box 1
Structure of public debt and ﬁ  nancial crisis: the case of Brazil
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NB:   The vertical lines correspond to the implementation of the two IMF 
programmes of USD 15 billion and USD 30 billion respectively.
Sources: national authorities.ARTICLES
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Renegotiation of sovereign bond debt
Characteristics of the main cases since 1995










Pakistan 1999 1 0.61 1.81
Ukraine 2000 0 3.30 2.73
Moldavia 2002 -10 0.04 0.14
Uruguay 2003 -1 5.35 2.08
Dominican Rep. 2005 0 1.10 0.28
Average (b) -0.6 2.32 1.41
Post-default
Russia 1998 -42 31.80 19.22
Ecuador 1999 -27 6.50 0.02
Argentina
(stage 2) 2001 -57
81.80 14.08
Average (b) -51.4 40.03 11.10
(a)  Year in which restructuring or default was announced.
(b)  For the haircut, weighted average (amount of eligible debt): otherwise simple 
average
Source: IMF, Drage (2005) – Banque de France calculations.
Private creditors’ balance sheets were affected by 
the loss of value of the assets held in the form of 
sovereign debts. The analysis of the major recent 
cases of restructuring of bond debt (Table) show that, 
in the event of restructuring, the nominal haircut 
is signiﬁ  cantly higher when it is accompanied by 
payment suspension: the average reduction of the 
nominal value of the debt came to 51%, as compared 
with less than 1% when the process took place 
without payment suspension.
WHAT DO DEBT STRUCTURES REFLECT?
As Tirole (2002) emphasises, it is difﬁ  cult  to 
assume that even risky forms of sovereign debt 
do not reﬂ  ect an equilibrium sought by market 
participants given that they themselves are directly 
impacted in the event of a crisis. More generally, 
sovereign debts features reﬂ  ect a trade-off between 
two requirements analysed, among others, by Gai 
and al. (2001) and Dooley (2000): ﬁ  rstly, ensuring 
that the sovereign debtor honours the terms of the 
debt contract when it has the ﬁ  nancial means to do 
so (ex ante efﬁ  ciency); secondly, making sure that 
the forms of debt do not make unavoidable defaults 
too costly for the sovereign (ex post efﬁ  ciency). The 
analysis of these two dimensions is crucial for the 
international community: a poor understanding of 
the determinants of debt structures leads to the risk 
of addressing crisis symptoms rather than market 
imperfections and fundamental causes.
There are several types of incentives for sovereign 
debtors and investors to prefer risky forms of debt.
 
Creditors’ shift to risky forms of debt may be a 
response to the weakness of safeguards at hand to 
ensure compliance with the terms of sovereign debt 
contracts. In fact, the guarantees required by creditors 
offer limited protection: Bolton and Jeanne (2004) 
report that the collateral backing debt instruments 
issued by the 79 developing and emerging economies 
with at least one international debt represented 6.2% 
of total outstandings on 1 January 2003. In addition, 
guarantees are difﬁ  cult to enforce or seize when 
they exist and the jurisdictional solutions are costly 
and uncertain. These difﬁ  culties, which are inherent 
to sovereign debt make it difﬁ  cult for creditors to 
differentiate between debtors  facing debt servicing 
problems for fundamental reasons (inability to pay) 
and those that default for reasons of convenience 
(refusal to pay). In this regard, increasing the cost 
of non-compliance with the contractual terms of the 
debt is a way of reducing the sovereign’s incentive 
to default for tactical reasons. Lastly, Bolton and 
Jeanne (2004) point out that private investors also 
face the risk of the dilution of their claims with the 
increase in the probability of sovereign default. In 
fact, it is in the interests of a sovereign debtor that 
plans to suspend debt service payments to issue new 
securities in order to complicate ex post inter-creditor 
co-ordination and reduce the recovery value that 
they may obtain from the process of renegotiation. 
For the sovereign, the recourse to risky forms of debt 
makes it possible to reduce immediate ﬁ  nancing 
costs by taking on the cost of exchange rate risk 
premiums for instance. It also allows the sovereign 
to enhance its creditworthiness. Indeed, contracting 
forms of debt that potentially increase the cost of 
crises is a guarantee of discipline, which is all the 
more necessary since monetary policy is not always 
entirely credible in emerging market economies. 
Risky forms of debt also have the advantage of 
limiting the risks of temporal inconsistency, given 
that they create a de facto link between successive 
governments. However, the predominance of risky 
ﬁ  nancing, particularly foreign-currency denominated 
or exchange-rate indexed securities, is also the ARTICLES
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consequence, not only of structural problems, but also 
economic policy choices. Tirole and Pathak (2004) 
suggest for example that in countries with a ﬁ  xed 
exchange rate regime, it is difﬁ  cult for the sovereign 
to openly reduce its foreign currency denominated 
debt or recommend that its private residents do the 
same, given that this could contribute to damaging 
the credibility of the adopted exchange rate. 
More generally, sovereign debts in forms and for 
amounts that are risky reﬂ  ect certain characteristics 
of the international capital markets and the 
monetary history of the sovereign. With regard 
to the functioning of markets, Eichengreen et al. 
(2002) identify three main factors that weaken 
investors’ incentive to hold securities that would 
however be less risky: the existence of cross-border 
transaction costs, the asymmetrical size of issuers and 
the fact that returns from portfolio diversiﬁ  cation are 
diminishing at the margin. Reinhart et al. (2003) show 
that the monetary (hyperinﬂ  ation) and ﬁ  nancial 
(default episodes) track records of sovereigns help 
explain some sovereigns’ inability to sustain even 
relatively low levels of external debt.
2| ORDERLY DEBT RESTRUCTURING:
  WHAT KIND 
  OF BANKRUPTCY REGIME 
  FOR SOVEREIGNS?
Following the switch to disintermediated ﬁ  nancing 
and with the emergence of sovereign defaults on 
international bonds, numerous proposals for reform 
have been put forward to adapt the international 
ﬁ   nancial architecture, which, taken broadly, 
encompasses not only ofﬁ  cial sector institutions 
and bodies but also covers contractual practices and 
market conventions.
2|1  Grounds for reform
COMMON CONSIDERATIONS
The various reform proposals put forward in the 
past ﬁ  ve years share a number of common features 
that converge towards the idea that sovereign debt 
restructuring processes (ex post efﬁ  ciency) may be 
improved without necessarily weakening market 
discipline (ex ante efﬁ  ciency).
The lack of a clear framework for dealing with 
unsustainable sovereign debt poses a moral hazard 
problem. It is a source of uncertainty as regards the 
response of the international community in the face 
of these situations. The international community 
could be tempted to avoid necessary restructuring 
by granting large-scale ﬁ  nancial assistance. Such a 
practice is likely to encourage sovereigns to manage 
their liabilities less than prudently and creditors to 
underestimate risks. To avoid such a situation, it is 
necessary to make the actions of the international 
community more predictable. 
A ﬁ   rst response to this problem consists in 
strengthening the discipline of the IMF’s ﬁ  nancing 
policy, by making operational the principle that 
holds that the granting of additional liquidity is not 
an efﬁ  cient response to a sovereign’s insolvency. This 
was the effect expected of the implementation in 
2003 of criteria and procedures governing exceptional 
access to IMF resources. In the same way, efforts 
have been made to clarify the Fund’s policy on 
lending into arrears, which, via conditionality, has 
an inﬂ  uence on sovereigns’ and investors’ relative 
bargaining power in the event of default (Box 2).
None of the suggestions for reform call into question 
the importance of both market discipline and the 
ﬁ  nancial cost arising in debt crises as incentives for 
the sovereign to honour its commitments. 
That said, the various proposals note that the cost of 
restructuring is particularly high, not only for private 
creditors and sovereign debtors (via the loss of access 
to the international capital markets over a period 
of time, the weakening of the ﬁ  nancial system and 
the shrinking of trade and economic activity), but 
also for the international community. The Fund’s 
ﬁ  nancial commitment in recent sovereign debt crises 
has increased its credit risk. While the institution’s 
liquidity is not currently at risk, the fact remains that 
the three major IMF debtors as of 31 December 2004 
— Argentina, Brazil and Turkey — i.e. 70% of the 
outstandings of loans drawn on the General Resources 
Account, all recorded a public debt-to-GDP ratio of 
over 55%, with the average climbing from 39% in 
1997 to 87% in 2004 (Chart 9).ARTICLES
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Several signs point to the need to improve 
current workout procedures for sovereign debt 
crises. Firstly, certain sovereigns’ tendency to 
accumulate unsustainable debt and “gamble on their 
resurrection” reveals the limits of market discipline 
(notably common agency problems). Secondly, in 
the event of default, the lack of information provided 
by relative prices encourages players to behave in 
a non-cooperative manner and, therefore, increases 
the cost and duration of the renegotiation process. It 
has been noted that recent pre-default renegotiations 
have been settled more rapidly than those that are 
accompanied by payment suspension (Chart 10).
Chart 9
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Sources: IMF, national authorities – Banque de France calculations. 
Box 2
IMF lending into sovereign arrears to private creditors
The IMF’s Lending Into Arrears (LIA) Policy is one of the two pillars of the IMF’s strategy for addressing sovereign debt 
crises. It complements the principle that holds that signing a programme with the IMF is a prerequisite for the renegotiation 
of debt by private creditors.
As part of the LIA policy, the Fund’s ﬁ  nancial assistance aims mainly, ﬁ  rst, to give credibility to programme conditionality, 
and second, prevent private creditors from having a de facto right of veto on the programme. In fact, until 1989 when 
the G10 recognised that this created problems, the ﬁ  nancial policy of the IMF prohibited it from assisting countries that 
had not discharged the payment arrears on their private debts. Initially limited to arrears on payments to banks, it now 
covers bonds.
In order to prevent abuse, this policy is activated on a case-by-case basis and governed by several criteria that have been 
revised with the transformations in the ﬁ  nancing of emerging market economies. The last reform (1999), which extended 
to arrears on bond debt, introduced the criteria according to which the sovereign debtor must “make good faith efforts” to 
arrive at an agreement with its creditors. In practice, this policy is little used (Ecuador 2000, Ukraine 1999).
Recent experience in the area of default and the renegotiation of sovereign debt suggests that the current form of the LIA 
policy needs to be revisited. It is indeed enlightening that in the case of Argentina, the IMF’s strategy did not make it possible 
to structure the renegotiation of the sovereign debt either via the Fund’s conditionality as an insurance provided to creditors 
of sound macroeconomic management, or via the LIA policy as a means of leading the parties to an agreement.ARTICLES
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Chart 10
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Sources: IMF, Drage (2005) and various sources.
REFORMS CENTRED ON RESTRUCTURING
The main reform proposals put forward in 
recent years aim to make the working out of 
unsustainable sovereign debt more intelligible and 
more predictable. Others, such as the previously 
mentioned “debt regime” put forward by Cohen 
and Portes (2004), are backed by a framework for 
sovereign debt restructuring.
This is due to the growing recognition of the need 
to strengthen the Prague framework deﬁ  ned in 
2000 by the International Monetary and Financial 
Committee (IMCF) by proposing predictable rules 
of action.6 While this general framework for crisis 
resolution deﬁ  nes a number of broad principles, it in 
fact provides little information on the management 
of sovereign debt restructuring. Yet when the 
probability of default of a sovereign issuer increases, 
clear rules of action play a decisive role in arriving 
at a co-operative solution. Indeed, in such situations, 
creditors, acting individually, can have an incentive 
to seize assets or collateral belonging to the sovereign 
(“grab race”), or undertake legal action in the event 
of default, although collective action would lead to 
an optimal solution.
In addition, the deﬁ  nition of a clear and predictable 
bankruptcy regime is the counterpart of the 
introduction of the Fund’s new ﬁ  nancing facilities. 
The creation in 1998 and 1999 of the Supplemental 
Reserve Facility (SRF) and the Contingent Credit 
Line (CCL) was perceived as the start of the 
IMF’s move towards the status of an international 
quasi-lender of last resort. In terms of amounts, 
conditions in both the SRF and the CCL were more 
ﬂ  exible than in existing facilities, and these new 
instruments entailed a moral hazard risk that was 
underlined by the opponents of these reforms. 
In fact, even the proponents of these changes in 
the IMF toolkit, such as Fischer (1999), afﬁ  rmed 
that the constitution of a bankruptcy regime going 
beyond the informal procedures of the Paris and 
London Clubs was a necessary complement for 
reducing the moral hazard risks associated with 
the Fund’s new loan instruments.
Initiatives have been launched on the prevention 
and structuring of sovereign debt. Firstly, in 
2001, the international community published 
recommendations on the management of public 
debt, based notably on the recognition of the 
ﬁ  nancial risks entailed in certain forms of sovereign 
borrowing and the identiﬁ  cation of “best practices” 
in this area. 
Secondly, Borenzstein and Mauro (2002)7 give 
substance to the notion, which emerged in the 
1980s, of reducing the sensitivity of the debt-to-GDP 
ratio to macroeconomic shocks via the issuance 
of securities whose coupons are indexed to GDP 
growth. These types of securities are expected to 
yield higher (or lower) interests when growth is 
stronger (or weaker) than a predeﬁ  ned level. For 
the investor, an asset of this type would have the 
same characteristics as a share, insofar as it gives 
the investor an interest in the macroeconomic 
performance of the issuing country. This type of 
instrument exists: for instance, within the framework 
of Phase 2 of its debt restructuring, Argentina has 
issued securities that include elements indexed 
to GDP. However there are a number of obstacles 
hindering the diffusion of such instruments such 
as veriﬁ  ability of GDP values, depth and liquidity 
of the markets trading these securities.
Lastly, recent analyses focus on assessing the 
implications for the IMF of the agency problems 
observed on bond markets. The central argument 
6  For recognition by the private sector, see the IIF’s Action Plan (2001).
7  See also Borensztein et al. (2004), who broaden the debate and discuss the idea of indexation on real variables.ARTICLES
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of these analyses is that the delegated monitor 
function,8 which banks perform de facto on behalf 
of investors on the bank lending market, is not 
performed on the bond market. The issue is whether 
the IMF can and should make up for this deﬁ  ciency 
in the international ﬁ  nancial system. The empirical 
results obtained by Eichengreen, Kletzer, Mody 
(2005) suggest that the Fund already plays this 
role: they ﬁ  nd that the monitoring function of IMF 
programmes, as opposed to the lending function, 
has a more marked impact on the risk premium 
when the country borrows mainly from the bond 
market. In institutional terms, these studies 
reconsider the relative weight of macroeconomic 
monitoring and lending functions in IMF activities. 
In certain respects, the notion of a non-borrowing 
programme brought up within the G7 in 2004 is an 
extension of this type of analysis. Tirole (2002) goes 
as far as to consider that the IMF should focus on 
its monitoring function.
2|2 Formal  regime
 and  market-based  approach
While they all aim to deﬁ  ne a bankruptcy regime 
for sovereigns, the main initiatives in the area of 
restructuring are based on different approaches. 
Krueger’s proposal (2001) in favour of a “Sovereign 
Debt Restructuring Mechanism” (SDRM), favours 
a formal approach based on an international legal 
framework. The recommendations on collective 
action clauses (CAC) made by the G10 Working 
Group chaired by R. Quarles and the code of good 
conduct suggested by the Banque de France for their 
part favour an informal approach to restructuring. 
These two approaches are more complementary 
than oppositional. Their link is notably based on the 
demarcation of the roles that the Fund must play in 
the various stages of debt crises.
IS IT IMPOSSIBLE TO DEVISE 
A FORMAL BANKRUPTCY REGIME?
Krueger’s proposal was meant to be a direct 
response to two features of the second half of the 
1990s. Firstly, with the increasing recourse to bond 
ﬁ  nancing, emerging market sovereigns’ investor 
base has spread considerably and diversiﬁ  ed. 
Secondly, the success at the end of the 1990s of 
hold-out strategies against sovereigns that had 
restructured their bond debt was considered liable 
to upset the functioning of international capital 
markets. These strategies may be ﬁ  nancially 
advantageous if they make it possible to obtain 
repayment at par value, given that participation 
in a securities exchange offer goes hand in hand 
with a loss in net present value. Insofar as they 
introduce some uncertainty in the result of the 
exchange offer, hold-out strategies may nevertheless 
weaken creditors’ incentive to participate in the 
exchange and prevent the global restoration of 
debt sustainability. They also increase the risk of 
liquidity crises, as investors seek to rapidly part 
with securities that are likely to be restructured. 
Over the 18-month work period, the proposal in 
favour of a SDRM has undergone signiﬁ  cant changes. 
Broadly speaking, the ﬁ  rst version gave the Fund 
a predominant role in the renegotiation process. 
In particular, it was up to the Fund to grant the 
sovereign an international stay on litigations, so as to 
allow it to suspend repayment and draw up a reform 
programme and a renegotiation offer. In the second 
version, the Fund played a highly reduced role, with 
the suspension of legal action being subject to the 
approval of a qualiﬁ  ed majority of creditors. 
The de facto interruption of work on the SDRM in 
April 2003 reﬂ  ects both the political and technical 
concerns raised by this mechanism.
Some of the political reticence stems from the extent 
of the overhaul that would have arisen from the 
implementation of the SDRM, in order to counter 
a risk whose real existence and scope had not been 
clearly proven.9 In addition, as Sgard (2004) shows, 
the reduction in the IMF’s role, as work on the 
mechanism proceeded, shows that the ﬁ  rst version of 
the mechanism created the risk of the interference of 
the ofﬁ  cial sector in private contracts, all the greater 
because the IMF would have had the status of both 
bankruptcy judge and preferred creditor. By virtue 
8   The meaning of the term “monitor” as used here covers the notions of adviser/guide/instructor, while also emphasising the supervisory aspect. Guitián (1992) seems 
to consider IMF surveillance as a form of “monitoring”.
9    Hold-out strategies are long, costly and uncertain, which makes them less attractive to most private investors. In addition, a number of legal reforms have been 
implemented to limit them (notably under Belgian law). Lastly, the participation rates observed in exchange offers following the Elliott vs. Peru court decision (2000) 
– which led to the Krueger proposal – do not conﬁ  rm the fears underlying the Krueger proposal.ARTICLES
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of the tacit agreement – not based on law – between 
all member countries, the IMF in fact enjoys a 
privileged status, which gives its loans precedence 
in the order of repayment over all private sector 
loans in particular.
Technically, the SDRM was hampered, despite 
the changes, by a number of limitations that cast 
doubts on any potential beneﬁ  ts. Firstly, it obviously 
could not liquidate all the issuer’s assets, though, in 
a formal bankruptcy regime, this possibility is an 
incentive for economic agents to co-operate in order 
to arrive at a sustainable solution. 
Secondly, there was the risk that the SDRM could 
effectively undermine the ﬁ  nancial discipline of 
some sovereigns. In fact, it did not ward off the 
possibility of repeated restructuring requests from 
sovereigns that have not been able to restore solvency 
in a ﬁ  rst restructuring processing (or from those that 
conduct undisciplined economic policies).
Thirdly, the comparative advantage of the SDRM 
over ad hoc resolution was not clearly established. 
The complex majority rules to approve the terms 
of restructuring – notably loan aggregation clauses 
– did not ensure that the process would lead to a 
decision to restructure. Given the impossibility of 
liquidating the sovereign’s assets, the only solution 
allowing the mechanism to lead to an agreement 
would have been to give a decision-making body the 
power to impose restructuring terms in the event 
of continuing disagreement between creditors, in 
the manner of the “cram down procedure” that 
exists in US bankruptcy law, which largely inspired 
Krueger’s proposal. The SDRM did not provide for 
this solution.
WHAT WOULD BE THE SHAPE 
OF A MARKET-BASED APPROACH?
The difﬁ  culties of establishing a formal bankruptcy 
regime for sovereign debtors, the desire to prevent 
government interference in private contracts, the 
need to refrain from weakening market discipline 
and the realisation that bond debt exchange offers 
had made it possible to resolve some cases of 
unsustainable debt all led to the emergence of a 
market-based approach. Speciﬁ  cally, while the SDRM 
was based on the idea that a profound overhaul was 
required to address the difﬁ  culties posed by the new 
forms of sovereign debt, the market-based approach 
aims to adapt the international ﬁ  nancial architecture. 
It is based on two complementary pillars: 
• the contractual deﬁ  nition, via collective action 
clauses (CAC), of a set of rules applicable to the 
main decisions of the restructuring process,
e.g. acceptance of exchange offers, modiﬁ  cation of the 
ﬁ  nancial terms of contracts, creditor representation 
and information provision;
• the deﬁ  nition of general principles aimed at making 
sovereign debt crisis resolution more predictable.
Since the G10 Quarles Report (2002), CAC have 
become a standard element in bond contracts 
drawn up by sovereign issuers on the main primary 
markets, including the New York market, which 
did not previously use these types of clauses
(Box 3). They are a decentralised response to 
collective action problems between bond creditors. 
Though the G10 Report contains a number of 
technical recommendations, the international 
community did not wish to deﬁ  ne them as standards. 
Consequently, the rationale behind the spread of 
CAC is that of appropriation by market players 
and gradual standardisation in line with their own 
requirements. Interestingly, and in contrast to the 
fears of a number of players, empirical studies by 
Eichengreen and Mody (2000), Becker, Richards and 
Tchaicharoen (2001) as well as Gugiatti and Richards 
(2003) show that the incorporation of these clauses in 
emerging market issuers’ contracts does not lead to a 
signiﬁ  cant rise in the risk premiums that are applied 
to them. At this stage, despite the widespread use 
of CAC, their ability to enhance the sovereign debt 
restructuring process has yet to be put to the test. 
In addition, recent security exchange offers suggest 
that restructuring based on market techniques is not 
necessarily subject to the activation of CAC. 
The deﬁ  nition of general principles for sovereign 
debt restructuring is the second pillar of a market-
based approach.  This initiative, discussed for the 
ﬁ  rst time at the G20 Ministerial Meeting in New 
Delhi in 2002, responds to three considerations. 
First, the forms of emerging market sovereign 
debt reﬂ  ect market equilibrium. Second, reforms 
in sovereign debt restructuring must not lead to a 
reduction in capital ﬂ  ows towards emerging markets. 
Third, the costs of restructuring may be reduced 
if the risk of unsustainable debt is identiﬁ  ed in a ARTICLES
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timely manner and resolved through co-operation 
by market players.
Research in this area was conducted by an informal 
group bringing together emerging market sovereign 
issuers, representatives of private creditors and 
the ofﬁ  cial sector. It resulted in the “Principles for 
Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructurings in 
Emerging Markets” (Box 4).
The Principles currently have several limitations. 
Firstly, the parties involved, both sovereign issuers 
and the private sector, are yet to fully accept them. 
For the private sector, there is the fear that despite 
the strictly voluntary nature of the Principles, they 
might have legal force in certain jurisdictions and 
therefore prove to be binding on private creditors. 
Secondly, the Principles do not clarify certain 
crucial points for the orderly restructuring of 
sovereign debt: circumstances that legitimise 
concerted and temporary payment suspension, 
role of creditor committees. Thirdly, the Principles 
are not sufﬁ  ciently operational in their current 
state to serve as a reference in the assessment of 
restructuring processes, not only by the parties 
involved, but also by the IMF. For instance, they 
could contribute only marginally to the assessment 
of creditors’ good faith within the Fund’s lending 
into arrears policy.
The real impact of the Principles shall depend 
mainly on the monitoring of their implementation. 
The idea of entrusting this task to a non-government 
body, which was discussed during the deﬁ  nition 
Box 3
Collective action clauses 
Incorporated into debt contracts, collective action clauses organise in advance the majority procedures and rules required 
for the renegotiation of contractual terms. Those recommended in the Quarles Report  covered the appointment of 
creditors’ representatives, the convening of creditor meetings, majority rules for modifying various contractual terms 
(“reserved matters” and other matters), payment acceleration, initiation of litigation against debtors, information provision 
and the exclusion of certain securities from the required calculation of majorities.
While there has been widespread use of these clauses since 2002 on the main markets, especially the New York market 
(see chart), this use does not cover all the clauses mentioned in the Quarles Report. Creditor representation clauses, for 
instance, particularly for renegotiating contracts, have been taken up very marginally. In addition, the majority rules used 
have not always been homogenous.
CAC and emerging market sovereign bond issues
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Box 4
The “Principles for Stable 
Capital Flows 
and Fair Debt Restructurings 
in Emerging Markets”
This short document presented in November 2004 by 
a group including the Institute of International Finance 
(IIF), which brings together 320 ﬁ  nancial institutions, 
and several representatives of sovereign issuers (Brazil, 
Mexico, Turkey, South Korea, Russia, etc.) is based on 
four fundamental principles: 
• transparency and timely disclosure of information, 
• close dialogue between debtors and creditors and 
  co-operation in order to prevent default, 
• good faith actions, 
• fair and equal treatment.
These Principles provide a non-binding reference whose 
strictly voluntary implementation should be considered 
on a case-by-case basis. 
of the Principles, has been set aside, at least for 
the moment. This solution brought to mind the 
experience of Britain’s Corporation of Foreign 
Bondholders (CFB), which operated from 1868 to 
the 1950s and has been analysed by Mauro and Yafeh 
(2003). It raises difﬁ  culties with regard to technical 
– protection of information conﬁ  dentiality – and 
legitimacy issues that make it untenable to duplicate 
some of the features and practices that made the 
CFB relatively efﬁ  cient.
WHAT ROLES SHOULD THE IMF PLAY?
Generally, in sovereign debt restructuring, the IMF 
performs, de facto, a threefold function of expert, 
“monitor” and lender. 
The function of expert entails providing 
economic and ﬁ   nancial information as well as 
assessing sovereign debt sustainability and the 
government’s ability to carry out the adjustments 
required to preserve this sustainability. The Fund’s 
monitoring of member countries, either pursuant to 
Article IV of its statutes or within the framework of 
programme reviews, turns up – or forces sovereigns 
to disclose – the main information required for 
the potential re-negotiation of debt contracts. By 
clarifying the economic and ﬁ  nancial stakes, the 
IMF facilitates the renegotiation process.
In addition, when sovereign debt has to be 
renegotiated, the deﬁ  nition of the macroeconomic 
framework  –  particularly in terms of ﬁ  scal 
performance and international reserves – determines 
the allocation of the economic and ﬁ  nancial effort 
between the various parties involved. In this 
regard, the monitoring of the programme – and 
consequently, of the burden-sharing of economic 
adjustment – makes the Fund the co-ordinator 
between the various interests represented.
Lastly, the IMF often has ﬁ  nancial commitments 
when sovereign debt is renegotiated. In recent 
sovereign bond renegotiations, outstanding IMF 
loans thus amounted to 8% and 4% of GDP in the 
pre-default and post-default cases respectively 
(Chart  11). Nevertheless, the IMF’s role as 
provider of capital is not solely a response to the 
ﬁ  nancial requirements of the crisis country. It is 
also, and perhaps even mainly, aimed at allowing 
orderly renegotiation and giving credibility to 
the sovereign’s commitments to the programme.
This aspect of ﬁ   nancial assistance is notably 
reﬂ  ected in the fact that IMF loans are paid in 
tranches and made conditional to the attainment 
of pre-deﬁ  ned objectives.
Chart 11
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The efﬁ   ciency of the market-based approach 
depends on the IMF’s effective performance of 
these three functions. In fact, this approach is an 
adaptation, rather than a questioning, of the debt 
crisis resolution framework of which these three 
functions constitute the matrix.
The Fund is best placed to create the incentive for 
the parties to implement the market-based approach. 
One of the beneﬁ  ts expected from this approach is 
that a sovereign facing a stock of unsustainable debt 
will be less tempted to “gamble for redemption” by 
putting off the decision to renegotiate the debt for 
as long as possible, and even going as far as default. 
Such a scenario supposes that there are incentives 
to reach a solution well before default. 
Provision by the IMF of economic information and 
debt sustainability analyses are decisive to ensuring 
neutral and transparent information and, therefore, 
favouring a co-operative renegotiation process. In 
addition, programme conditionality and the Fund’s 
ﬁ  nancial assistance are two levers for catalysing 
the efforts of the sovereign towards reaching a 
co-operative solution before default. 
Work on the SDRM has brought to light that in a 
formal bankruptcy regime it is difﬁ  cult for the IMF 
to play a direct role exceeding that of an expert. 
However, the implementation of a formal regime 
for managing post-default restructuring could have 
a positive effect on the market-based approach. In 
fact, for sovereigns and creditors, the prospect of 
having to activate an unwieldy and costly process in 
the event of default could incite them to anticipate 
this extreme situation and, therefore, implement a 
more informal approach beforehand. In other words, 
“the shadow of the law” of this bankruptcy regime 
on the market-based approach could contribute to 
making it more attractive. 
However, the challenge facing any scheme in 
which both approaches coexist is to establish rules 
and procedures that create the best incentives for 
the parties involved. The experience off the SDRM 
reveals the magnitude of such a task.
At least two lessons may be drawn from the ﬁ  nancial crises experienced over the last decade. First, 
emerging market sovereigns’ current ﬁ  nancing methods are a source of risk for all parties involved. 
Second, it is now widely acknowledged that the bond debt of emerging market sovereigns is as liable 
to be restructured as other forms of debt.
The emphasis placed by the international community on research into debt restructuring reﬂ  ects the 
fact that while there are fewer defaults, they involve larger volumes. It also reﬂ  ects the need to reduce 
the moral hazard risk arising from an unclear crisis resolution framework that depends too heavily on 
ﬁ  nancial assistance from the IMF. In practice, the international community is making the implicit choice 
to pursue the practice developed at the end of the 1980s. Recent reforms (CAC, Principles, policy of 
access to IMF resources) adapt, rather than transform the existing framework to the development of 
capital markets. This approach is not in opposition to a formal sovereign bankruptcy regime as proposed 
by the IMF in 2001. In certain aspects, such a regime, if it were feasible, would enhance the credibility 
of the market-based approach: the prospect of having to roll out an unwieldy and costly mechanism in 
the event of default could incite the parties to anticipate this extreme situation and, therefore, implement 
a more informal approach beforehand.
In this overhauled framework, the IMF would retain a central role insofar as it performs the triple function 
of expert, “monitor” and lender. The effectiveness of this framework based on principles will depend 
mainly on the Fund’s ability to fully perform these three functions.ARTICLES
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